The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind. An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of the mind in the natural world: its ontological status, how it fits into the causal fabric of the universe, and the nature of consciousness. The third section focuses on the much-debated subjects of content and intentionality. The fourth section examines a variety of mental capacities, including memory, imagination, and emotion. The fifth section looks at epistemic issues, in particular regarding knowledge of ones own and other minds. The volume concludes with a section on self, personhood, and agency.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind will be an invaluable resource for advanced students and scholars of philosophy, and also for researchers in neighbouring disciplines seeking a high-level survey of the state of the art in this flourishing field.
I. THE PLACE OF MIND IN NATURE ; 1. Mental Causation ; 2. The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism ; 3. Dualism ; 4. Epiphenomenalism ; 5. Anomalous Monism ; 6. Nonreductive Materialsim ; 7. Functionalism ; 8. What Is Property Physicalism? ; 9. What Is the Physical? ; 10. Idealism ; 11. Panpsychism ; II. THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNES IN NATURE ; 12. Subjectivity ; 13. Higher-order Theories of Consciousness ; 14. Representationalist Theories of Consciousness ; 15. Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities ; 16. The Explanatory Gap ; 17. Phenomenal Concepts ; 18. The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism ; III. INTENTIONALITY AND THEORIES OF MENTAL CONTENT ; 19. Intentional Systems Theory ; 20. Wide Content ; 21. Narrow Content ; 22. Information-theoretic Semantics ; 23. Biosemantics ; 24. A Measurement-theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes ; 25. The Normativity of the Intentional ; 26. Concepts and Possession Conditions ; 27. The Distinction between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content ; 28. Intentionalism ; 29. The Content of Perceptual Experience ; 30. Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind ; IV. SELF, UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY ; 31. Selves ; 32. Unity of Consciousness ; 33. Personal Identity and Metaphysics ; V. VARIETY OF MENTAL ABILITIES ; 34. Imagination ; 35. Thinking ; 36. Language and Thought ; 37. Consciousness and Reference ; 38. Memory ; 39. Emotions: Motivating Feelings ; 40. Intention and Intentional Action ; VI. EPISTEMIC ISSUES ; 41. Folk Psychology ; 42. Other Minds ; 43. Introspection ; 44. Semantic Externalism and Self-knowledge ; 45. Self-deception