This new text on game theory introduces and develops the key concepts with a minimum of mathematics. Students are presented with empirical evidence, anecdotes and strategic situations to help them apply theory and gain a genuine insight into human behaviour. The book provides a diverse collection of examples and scenarios from history, literature, sports, crime, theology, war, biology, and everyday life. These examples come with rich context that adds real-world meat to the skeleton of theory. Each chapter begins with a specific strategic situation and is followed with a systematic treatment that gradually builds understanding of the concept.
PART I: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS Introduction to Strategic Reasoning Building A Model of A Strategic Situation PART II: SOLVING STRATEGIC FORM GAMES Eliminating the Impossible:Solving A Game When Rationality is Common Knowledge Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete Games with Two Or Three Players Stable Play:Nash Equilibria in Discrete N-Player Games Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games Keep Em Guessing: Randomized Strategies PART III: SOLVING EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES Taking Turns: Sequential Games of Perfect Information Taking Turns in the Dark: Sequential Games of Imperfect Information PART IV: GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION I Know Something You Dont Know: Games with Private Information What You Do Tells Me Who You Are: Signaling Games Lies and the Lying Liars that Tell Them: Cheap Talk Games PART V: REPEATED GAMES Playing Forever: Repeated Interaction with Infinitely-Lived Players Cooperation and Reputation: Applications of Repeated Interaction with Infinitely-Lived Players Interaction in Infinitely-Lived Institutions PART VI: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Replicator Dynamics